There is a wall in Ethiopia, or more precisely the foundation of one, that is bringing a great amount of conflict into the world. This particular structure will eventually soar over 240 meters into the air, blocking off a vast gorge that the Omo River previously flowed through (Greste, 2009). Known as the Gilgel Gibe III hydroelectric dam, this construction project would be the second largest dam on the continent and could restructure the entire Nile region. Such a colossal engineering project is sure to drastically improve the impoverished country’s economic situation by supplying millions with access to water and hydroelectric power. However the effects of interfering with the natural flow of an entire ecosystem can be destructive and unintended consequences often emerge long after the original benefactors are in their graves.
The Nile has presented more disputes over water than any other source in the world. Stretching half a continent and collected from a diverse array of tributaries, the Nile gives life to ten arid countries that would otherwise be uninhabitable. Water supply for countries like Ethiopia and Egypt isn’t a matter of convenience, because blistering droughts or raging floods can cause death on pandemic proportions. Therefore the struggle for control of water resources is highly contemptuous.
Ethiopia is especially involved in conflicts over water resources around the Nile. Over 85 percent of all the water that enters the Nile stream flow is originates in Ethiopia (Shiva, 2002, pg 75). Much to the distain of upstream riparian states, Ethiopia is now planning to use their water resources to become a regional leader in energy exports. Indeed, regional and historical conflicts complicate Ethiopia’s proposed damming projects. During British colonial rule of the Nile region, Egypt reached an agreement with their colonial master that placed them in a position of privilege and power. By allowing Britain to control the Suez Canal, Egypt gained authority to “inspect and investigate” the whole length of the Nile, and the right to veto any construction project that would affect the water flow downstream (Alao, 2007, pg 217). Pointing to this treaty, Egypt recently reasserted their Nile rights. Last month Mohammed Allam, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, stated ominously, "Egypt reserves the right to take whatever course it sees suitable to safeguard its share” (Mutasa, 2010).
In spite of this opposition, Ethiopian government officials stress the necessity of the economic benefits Gilbel Gibe III will bring to the country. “We cannot afford to not have [it],” argued Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. "We need that type of mega-project given the increased domestic energy demand and the requirements of export. And secondly, it enables us to store water and regulate the flooding [downstream in the Omo River]” (Greste, 2009). While these certainly are valid arguments, there are a wide variety of environmental effects that must be taken into consideration as well.
In addition to the obvious effects of relocating people and water resources, reservoirs can increase the prevalence of malaria and other diseases. Malaria is passed through mosquitoes, which reproduce in slow moving water habitats. Therefore, the reservoir shorelines that migrant populations must relocate to are high-risk areas for malaria infection. A study conducted around the Gilgel-Gibe I dam by BioMed Central confirms the direct link between man-made reservoirs and malaria outbreaks (Yewhalaw, 2009). After testing 1,855 children living in high-risk communities close to the Gilgel-Gibe I and other distant control communities, the researchers found that proximity to the dam was the strongest discriminating factor in the prevalence of infections. In fact, children living by the slow moving water were 43% more likely to have a strain of malaria.
Moreover, such large-scale experimentation with water flow always runs the risk of damaging the ecosystem. An ill constructed dam can wreck havoc on nature at the same time that it controls flooding. The High Dam, built hastily by the Egyptians following their independence, provides a useful case study of the unintentional harm a dam can inflict. It is now estimated that as much as fifteen percent of the Nile flow evaporates from baking under the sun in the reservoir backed up behind the dam (Ward, 2002, pg 63). Silt, the soluble mineral deposits that fertilize otherwise barren riverbeds during the flood season, now settle to the bottom of the slow-moving reservoir. The buildup of silt requires near constant dredging and recycling of the water in the reservoir, and also results in a loss of naturally maintained fishery and agricultural zones. Instead of being sustained by silt deposits, these farms now have to use loads of fertilizers that further deteriorate the water quality.
Granted, the High Dam is a completely different dam than the Gilgel Gibe III. The High Dam was built back in 1971 by another country far upstream from Ethiopia. Regardless of these differences, there are other similarities between the High Dam and the Gilgel Gibe III that should raise concern, or at least consideration. For instance, the High Dam was notorious even before construction began for the urgency and hast put into its erection. Likewise the Gilgel Gibe III has already taken a similar route. Construction began before enough investment capital had even been raised to complete the project. Furthermore, the Italian corporation that initiated the project bypassed the environmental and social impact assessment that the international community usually expects for this type of massive infrastructure projects. Although a study was produced recently, it comes almost two years after construction began. Kenyan ecologist Richard Leaky is critical of this afterthought of a study and suspects, “"The scientists that I've shown [the EIA] to…suggest it is fatally flawed in terms of its logic, in terms of its thoroughness, in terms of its conclusions. [I]t looks like an inside job that has come up with the results that they were looking for to get the initial funding for this dam” (Greste, 2009).
Altogether, the general sense of shortsightedness that has driven the construction of the Gilgel Gibe III should raise serious red flags. This massive dam could lead to serious political, and even violent, conflicts. There could also be extreme changes to the environmental welfare of the Nile river flow, which have an equal potential for harming the quality of life. Ultimately the Gilgel Gibe III appears to a premature venture into damming that has the potential to create more harm than benefits.
References
Alao, Abiodun. (2007). Natural resources and conflict in Africa. Rochester,NY: University of Rochester Press.
Greste, Peter. (2009, March 26). The Dam that divides Ethiopians. BBC News, Ethiopia, Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
Mutasa, Haru, (2010, April 20). Egypt reasserts nile water rights. Aljazeera. Retrieved from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/04/20104135.html
Shiva, Vandana. (2002). Water wars: privatization, pollution, and profit. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Viala, E. (2008). Making the most of scarcity accountability for better water management in the middle east and north africa. Irrigation & Drainage Systems, 22(2), 189-191. doi:10.1007/s10795-008-9048-4
Ward, Diane. (2002). Water wars: drought, flood, folly, and the politics of thirst. New York, NY: Riverhead Books.
Yewhalaw, D., Legesse, W., Van Bortel, W., Gebre-Selassie, S., Kloos, H., Duchateau, L., & Speybroeck, N. (2009). Malaria and water resource development: The case of gilgel-gibe hydroelectric dam in ethiopia. Malaria Journal, 8, 1-10. doi:10.1186/1475-2875-8-21
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